Overview
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-57328 is a significant security flaw in the toggle-array package, widely used in software applications for manipulating properties on objects at a specified index. This vulnerability, termed as Prototype Pollution, exposes the systems to potential risks of system compromise and data leakage. The impact of this vulnerability is significant, as it allows attackers to inject properties on Object.prototype with a crafted payload, leading to a minimum consequence of Denial of Service (DoS).
Vulnerability Summary
CVE ID: CVE-2025-57328
Severity: High (CVSS: 7.5)
Attack Vector: Remote
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: None
Impact: System compromise, potential data leakage
Affected Products
A new way to communicate
Ameeba Chat is built on encrypted identity, not personal profiles.
Message, call, share files, and coordinate with identities kept separate.
- • Encrypted identity
- • Ameeba Chat authenticates access
- • Aliases and categories
- • End-to-end encrypted chat, calls, and files
- • Secure notes for sensitive information
Private communication, rethought.
Product | Affected Versions
Toggle-Array | v1.0.1 and before
How the Exploit Works
An attacker exploiting this vulnerability would craft a specific payload and inject it into the toggle-array package’s enable or disable function. This would cause the prototype of the Object to be polluted, an action that could have a variety of consequences depending on the attacker’s intent and the specific use of the affected software. At a minimum, this could cause a Denial of Service (DoS), but it could also lead to far more severe impacts such as system compromise or data leakage.
Conceptual Example Code
Below is a conceptual example of how the vulnerability might be exploited:
const ToggleArray = require('toggle-array');
let objectArray = [ { property: 'safe' }, { property: 'safe' } ];
let craftedPayload = '{"__proto__": {"injectedProperty": "compromised"}}';
ToggleArray.enable(objectArray, 0, craftedPayload);
console.log(objectArray[1].injectedProperty); // Outputs: compromisedIn the above example, the crafted payload `{“__proto__”: {“injectedProperty”: “compromised”}}` is injected into the `enable` function of the `toggle-array` package. This results in the prototype of all objects in the array being polluted with the `injectedProperty`, compromising the integrity of the system.