Overview
The vulnerability identified as CVE-2025-53022 is a serious flaw in TrustedFirmware-M (also known as Trusted Firmware for M profile Arm CPUs) versions preceding 2.1.3 and 2.2.x before 2.2.1. This vulnerability is of significant concern due to its potential to compromise system security and lead to data leakage. The issue arises due to a lack of length validation during a firmware upgrade, which could allow an attacker to manipulate the stack memory of the system during the upgrade process.
In the context of an increasingly interconnected world, this vulnerability’s significance escalates. Any device relying on the affected versions of TrustedFirmware-M, which could range from personal devices to corporate infrastructure, could potentially be exploited, leading to system compromise and data leakage.
Vulnerability Summary
CVE ID: CVE-2025-53022
Severity: High (CVSS Score – 8.6)
Attack Vector: Local/Remote
Privileges Required: None
User Interaction: Required
Impact: Potential system compromise or data leakage
Affected Products
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Product | Affected Versions
TrustedFirmware-M | 2.1.2 and earlier
TrustedFirmware-M | 2.2.0
How the Exploit Works
The vulnerability stems from the Firmware Upgrade (FWU) module’s inability to validate the length field of the Type-Length-Value (TLV) structure for dependent components against the maximum allowed size during a firmware upgrade. If the length specified in the TLV exceeds the size of the buffer allocated on the stack, the FWU module will overwrite the buffer (and potentially other stack data) with the TLV’s value content.
An attacker could exploit this vulnerability by crafting a malicious TLV entry in the unprotected section of the MCUBoot upgrade image. By setting the length field to exceed the expected structure size, the attacker can manipulate the stack memory of the system during the upgrade process.
Conceptual Example Code
The following is a conceptual example of how the vulnerability might be exploited. Please note that this code is hypothetical and for illustrative purposes only.
struct tlv {
uint32_t type;
uint32_t length;
uint8_t value[];
};
// Attacker crafts malicious TLV with length exceeding buffer size
struct tlv crafted_tlv = {
.type = VALID_TYPE,
.length = BUFFER_SIZE + OVERFLOW_AMOUNT,
.value = { /* Malicious payload here */ }
};
// Buffer on stack
uint8_t buffer[BUFFER_SIZE];
// Firmware update function
void update_firmware(struct tlv *update_tlv) {
// Copy TLV into buffer without length check
memcpy(buffer, update_tlv->value, update_tlv->length);
}
// Attacker triggers update
update_firmware(&crafted_tlv);In the above example, the attacker crafts a malicious TLV with a length field exceeding the buffer’s size. This leads to a buffer overflow, potentially overwriting other stack data, and allowing the attacker to manipulate the system’s stack memory.